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Introduction
In  October  2005 the  Australian  High  Court  in  Stevens  v  Kabushiki  Kaisha  Sony  
Computer Entertainment1 held that a modification chip for a Sony PlayStation was 
not  a  circumvention  device  because  it  was  not  being  employed  to  circumvent  a 
technological protection measure.   The great significance of this judgment is that it 
chose an interpretation of the law that guaranteed the liberty of digital consumers over 
an  interpretation  that  would  have  allowed  large  corporate  actors  to  increasingly 
restrict the way we consume knowledge and culture. It has been celebrated widely as 
one small, yet vitally important step, towards building a “constitutionalism” – a fair 
and just balancing of power relations - for a digital world whose landscape has been 
heavily shaped by (private sector) intellectual property owners.
In  August  2005  the  Australian  Parliament  through  its  House  of  Representatives 
Standing  Committee  on  Legal  and  Constitutional  Affairs  (LACA) commenced an 
inquiry  into  the  implementation  of  Art  17.4.7  of  the  Australia-US  Free  Trade 
Agreement (AUSFTA) which requires Australia to amend its anti-circumvention law 
in order to bring it into line with US anti-circumvention law.  A key question is to 
what extent the AUSFTA amendments, to be legislated no later than 1 January 2007, 
will make the reasoning of the Sony Case redundant.  The recommendations of LACA 
in its  Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions Report of February 
2006 suggest this will not be the case, although the issue is yet to be settled.
This paper outlines the reasoning in the Sony Case and then assesses its lasting impact 
in light of the LACA Report and the imminent implementation of art 17.4.7 of the 
AUSFTA.   It suggests that the wording of the AUSFTA and recent case law in the 
US  will  place  significant  pressure  on  the  Australian  Parliament  to  ensure  any 
amended anti-circumvention regime is clearly linked to copyright infringement and 
not an open ended notion of ‘access control’.  In a knowledge economy, where the 
distribution  and  consumption  of  content  is  vital  to  economic,  social  and  cultural 
advancement there is little sense in a legal regime that unnecessarily stifles access to 
knowledge
The  Australian  PlayStation  Case:  Kabushiki  Kaisha  Sony  Computer 
Entertainment v Stevens2
Eddie Stevens who was involved in the computer games industry in Sydney was sued 
by Sony pursuant to the anti-circumvention provisions of the Australian Copyright 
Act for modifying the Sony PlayStation (PS) computer games platform or console to 
allow it more functionality.  In particular Sony argued that Stevens had breached s 
116A of the  Copyright Act 1968 in that he had sold or distributed a circumvention 
device, namely mod chips, which he knew or ought reasonably have known would be 
1 [2005] HCA 58
2 [2002] FCA 906; [2003] FCAFC 157
used as a circumvention device. A circumvention device as defined by the Copyright  
Act,  is  something that  has  little  other  purpose than to  circumvent  a  technological 
protection measure (TPM). A technological protection measure is something that is 
designed to prevent access to, or copying of copyright subject matter. In this case the 
mod  chips  were  alleged  to  have  the  purpose  of  circumventing  Regional  Access 
Coding - as activated by the Boot Rom - the technological protection measure.3
The Technology
The  Sony  PlayStation  is  one  of  the  most  popular  computer  games  consoles  or 
platforms in the world. When a person wants to play a game they insert a disc into the 
PlayStation much like inserting a musical disc into a CD player.  The PlayStation is 
coded (through what is called Regional Access Coding (RAC) contained within a 
track on each CD read by a chip known as a “Boot ROM” located on the circuit board 
of  the  PlayStation  console  (hereafter  called  “RAC/Boot  Rom”))  to  play  games 
available in the region in which the PlayStation was sold.  This means that a game 
purchased  in  the  USA or  Japan  cannot  be  played  on  a  PlayStation  purchased  in 
Australia; the platform will not support it. As well a copied, burnt or unauthorised 
version of a game will not play on the PlayStation, as the copying process does not 
embed the necessary coding in the copy. As a consequence of consumers seeking 
greater choice of digital products or digital diversity, a device known as the “mod 
chip” or “converter” surfaced in the market place. It extended the functionality of the 
PlayStation allowing games from other regions as well  as copied,  unauthorised or 
burnt games to be played on the PlayStation. 
The Digital Agenda Amendments: Anti-Circumvention Law 
This  was  the  first  case  to  consider  the  anti-circumvention  law introduced  by  the 
Copyright  Amendment  (Digital  Agenda  Act)  2000.  Section  116A  Copyright  Act, 
effective 4th March 2001, introduced the anti-circumvention notion enshrined in art 11 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) into Australian law.  The section states:
Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), this section applies if: 
(a) a work or other subject-matter is protected by a technological protection 
measure; and 
(b) a person does any of the following acts without the permission of the owner or 
exclusive licensee of the copyright in the work or other subject-matter: 
(i) makes a circumvention device capable of circumventing, or  
facilitating the circumvention of, the technological protection 
measure;
(ii) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire 
or otherwise promotes, advertises or markets such a circumvention 
device;
(iii) distributes such a circumvention device for the purpose of trade, or  
for any other purpose that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright; 
(iv) exhibits such a circumvention device in public by way of trade; 
3 [2002] FCA 906 at  [24]
(v) imports such a circumvention device into Australia for the purpose of:  
(A) selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or 
exposing for sale or hire or otherwise promoting, advertising or 
marketing, the device; or 
(B) distributing the device for the purpose of trade, or for any 
other purpose that will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright;  
or 
(C) exhibiting the device in public by way of trade; 
(vi) makes such a circumvention device available online to an extent that  
will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright; 
(vii) provides, or by way of trade promotes, advertises or markets, a  
circumvention service capable of circumventing, or facilitating the 
circumvention of, the technological protection measure; and 
(iv) the person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the device 
or service would be used to circumvent, or facilitate the circumvention 
of, the technological protection measure.
 
A technological protection measure (TPM) is defined under s 10 (1) Copyright Act  
as:
A  device or product, or a component incorporated into a process, that is designed, in the  
ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work 
or other subject-matter by either or both of the following means: 
(a) by ensuring that access to the work or other subject matter is available solely by use of an  
access code or process (including decryption, unscrambling or other transformation of the  
work or other subject-matter) with the  authority of the  owner or exclusive licensee of the  
copyright;  
(b) through a copy control mechanism. 
A circumvention device is also defined in s 10 (1) Copyright Act as:
A device (including a computer program) having only a limited commercially significant  
purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other than the circumvention, or facilitating the 
circumvention, of an technological protection measure.
Section 116A (5) creates the civil cause of action against the infringer:
If this section applies, the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright may bring an action 
against the person.
The First Instance Decision in the Federal Court on s 116A – RAC/Boot Rom is not a  
TPM and Therefore the Mod Chip is not a Circumvention Device
At first instance Sackville J held that Regional Access Coding (RAC)/Boot Rom was 
not a technological protection measure because it did not and was not designed to 
prevent access to the copyright content or to act as a copy control mechanism of the 
copyright  content.  The crucial  finding being that  RAC/Boot  Rom did not prevent 
reproduction of a game, it only prevented use of a game that was not coded for the 
region in which the PlayStation was sold.4  Therefore, the mod chip could not be a 
circumvention device because it was not designed for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological protection measure.5  Sackville J rejected the argument that RAC/Boot 
Rom had the “practical effect” of inhibiting or preventing access or copying in that it 
created  a  disincentive  for  copying  by  making  it  difficult  for  copied  games  to  be 
played. He explained:
There seems to be nothing in the legislative history to support the view that a technological 
measure is to receive legal protection from circumvention devices if the only way in which 
the  measure  prevents  or  inhibits  the  infringement  of  copyright  is  by  discouraging 
infringements of copyright which predate the attempt to gain access to the work or to copy 
it.6  
However the Judge did comment that if RAC/Boot Rom were a TPM then the mod 
chip would have satisfied the definition of a circumvention device.7 Further, Justice 
Sackville rejected a submission from the ACCC that in order for a device to be a 
“technological protection measure”,  its  sole purpose must  be to prevent  or inhibit 
infringement of copyright, noting that a TPM may have a dual purpose.8
The more complex argument made by Sony was that RAC/Boot Rom was a TPM 
because it prevented copies of the games being made in the RAM (Random Access 
Memory) or temporary memory of the PlayStation console.9  The Judge rejected this 
argument predominantly on the basis that reproduction in RAM was of such a limited 
and temporary nature that it was not reproduction “in a material form” as required by 
s 31 (1) (a) (i) Copyright Act.10  
Sony continued this  line of  reasoning and alleged that  playing  PlayStation games 
created a copy of a cinematographic film in RAM. This argument was also rejected, 
explicitly on the ground that a substantial part of the film was not copied in RAM and 
implicitly because the film was not “embodied” in RAM.11  
The reasoning of Sackville J in  Stevens  along with that of Emmett J of the Federal 
Court  in  Australian  Video  Retailers  Association  v  Warner  Home Video  Pty  Ltd12 
establish a principle that reproduction of a computer program in RAM will not be 
regarded as an infringing reproduction for the purposes of the Copyright Act unless it 
is  reproduced  in  a  manner  and  on  a  technology  that  will  allow  that  temporary 
reproduction  to  be  captured  and  further  reproduced.13 The  message  being  that 
4 [2002] FCA 906 at  [92, 118]
5 cf. Sony v Gamemasters 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sony Computer Entertainment v Owen 
[2002] EWHC 45; Sony v Ball [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch); B Esler, “Judas or Messiah: The Implication 
of  the  Mod  Chip  Cases  for  Copyright  in  an  Electronic  Age”  (2004)  1  Hertfordshire  L  J  1 
http://perseus.herts.ac.uk/uhinfo/library/u20277_3.pdf  See also an Italian decision (Court of Bolzano) 
on the legality of the mod chip at:  http://www.alcei.it/english/actions/psmodchip.htm
6 [2002] FCA 906 at  [117]
7 [2002] FCA 906 at  [167]
8 [2002] FCA 906 at [104]
9 [2002] FCA 906 at  [119 ff]
10 [2002] FCA 906 at  [137]
11  [2002] FCA 906 at [158]-[160]
12 (2001) 53 IPR 242 at 262-3
13 [2002] FCA 906 at  [137, 147-8, 150] This position has now changed as a result of  Article 17.4.1 of 
the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement which obliges Australia to enact laws giving copyright owners 
“use/playing” of a computer game is not of itself an infringement under the Copyright 
Act.   
The Full Federal Court – RAC/Boot Rom is a TPM and the Mod Chip is a  
Circumvention Device
On  30  July  2003,  the  Full  Federal  Court  of  Australia  (French,  Lindgren  and 
Finkelstein JJ) overturned the decision of Sackville J at first instance, and held that 
the  sale  and  distribution  of  PlayStation  mod  chips  contravened  s116A  of  the 
Copyright Act.  The Court  held that Regional Access Coding (RAC) embedded on 
PlayStation Games and activated by the Boot Rom chip on the circuit board of the 
PlayStation console  was a  technological  protection measure  for  the purposes of  s 
116A  Copyright  Act even  though  it  did  not  prevent  copying  as  such  but  merely 
provided a disincentive for copying or burning games – the so called “practical effect 
argument”.14
In the words of Lindgren J:
If, as in the present case, the owner of copyright in a computer program devises a technological 
measure  which  has  the  purpose  of  inhibiting  infringement  of  that  copyright,  the  legislature 
intended  that  measure  to  be  protected  (subject  to  any  express  exception),  even  though  the 
inhibition is indirect and operates prior to the hypothetical attempt at access and the hypothetical 
operation of the circumvention device. By ensuring that access to the program is not available 
except by use of the Boot ROM, or the access code embedded in the PlayStation games, or both in 
combination, Sony's measure does inhibit the infringement of copyright in the PlayStation games 
in that way. 15 
Likewise French J explained:
If  a  device  such  as  an  access  code  on  a  CD-ROM in  conjunction  with  a  Boot  ROM in  the 
PlayStation console renders the infringing copies of computer games useless, then it would prevent 
infringement  by  rendering  the  sale  of  the  copy  “impracticable  or  impossible  by  anticipatory 
action”.16
However in obiter  the majority (French and Lindgren JJ,  Finkelstein J dissenting) 
supported Sackville J’s holding that playing a PlayStation game and reproducing it 
temporarily in the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the PlayStation console  did 
not amount to a reproduction in a material form for the purposes of the  Copyright  
Act.17 Once  again  in  obiter  the  majority  (French  and  Lindgren  JJ,  Finkelstein  J 
dissenting)  supporting  Sackville  J’s  decision,  apparently  with  slightly  different 
the right to prohibit all types of reproduction, in any manner or form, permanent or temporary. This 
change is implemented under the  US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) which 
came into effect on 1 January 2005. The Act amends the definition of ‘material form’ and ‘copy’ in 
section 10 of the Act and creates an exception to infringement where the reproduction is made as part 
of  the technical  process of using a non-infringing copy of  the copyright  material  (see ss 43B and 
111B). The critical difference being that temporary reproduction of a whole or substantial part of a 
computer program (game) or film (game) in RAM generated from an infringing copy of the copyright 
material will be unlawful.
14 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 at [20], [139], [189].
15 Per Lindgren J at [139] 
16 At [20];
17 At [168] [26]; cf  [208-210] 
reasoning,  held that there is not a copy of cinematographic film made in RAM when 
a game is played, because there is no “embodiment in an article” as defined by ss 10 
and  24 Copyright Act.18
The case was appealed to the High Court of Australia.19   
The High Court   –  Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment 20-  
RAC/Boot Rom is not a TPM and Therefore the Mod Chip is not a Circumvention 
Device
In  October 2005, the High Court  of Australia  overturned the decision of the Full 
Federal  Court  that  RAC/Boot  ROM was  a  TPM and confirmed  the  reasoning  of 
Justice Sackville to hold that Eddie Stevens was not liable for infringement of s 116A 
of the Australian  Copyright Act.21   The Court also agreed with Sackville J and the 
majority  in  the  Full  Federal  Court  that  Sony’s  arguments  based  on  temporary 
reproduction in RAM could not be sustained.22
The majority judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ explained 
that Justice Sackville’s interpretation was correct for the following reasons:
It is important to understand that the reference to the undertaking of acts which, if carried out, 
would or might infringe, is consistent with the fundamental notion that copyright comprises the 
exclusive right to do any one or more of "acts" primarily identified in ss 31 and 85-88 of the Act. 
The definition of "technological  protection measure" proceeds on the footing that,  but  for  the 
operation of the device or product or component incorporated into a process, there would be no 
technological or mechanical barrier to "access" the copyright material or to make copies of the 
work after "access" has been gained. The term "access" as used in the definition is not further 
explained in the legislation. It may be taken to identify placement of the addressee in a position 
where, but for the "technological protection measure", the addressee would be in a position to 
infringe. 
This  construction  of  the  definition  is  assisted  by  a  consideration  of  the  "permitted  purpose" 
qualifications to the prohibitions imposed by s 116A(1). First, s 116A(3) provides that, in certain 
circumstances, the section does not apply in relation to the supply of a circumvention device "to a 
person  for  use  for  a  permitted  purpose".  The  term "supply"  means  selling  the  circumvention 
device,  letting  it  for  hire,  distributing  it  or  making  it  available  online  (s 116A(8)).  Secondly, 
s 116A(4) states that the section in certain circumstances does not apply in relation to the making 
or importing of a circumvention device "for use only for a permitted purpose". 
The expression "permitted purpose" in sub-ss (3) and (4) has the content given it by sub-s (7). This 
states that for the purposes of s 116A, a circumvention device is taken to be used for a permitted 
purpose only if two criteria are met. The first criterion is that the device be "used for the purpose 
18 At [181-3], [26]; cf. [222-4]
19 See B Fitzgerald, “The Playstation Mod Chip: A Technological Guarantee of the Digital Consumer’s 
Liberty  or  Copyright  Menace/Circumvention  Device?” 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp An earlier and shorter version of this paper 
appears in (2005) 10 Media and Arts Law Review 89 
20 [2005] HCA 58
21 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment [2005] HCA 58
22 All judges made detailed comments regarding the method of statutory interpretation: [30]-[34] per 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; [124]- [127] per McHugh J; [168]-[169], [215]-[219] 
per Kirby J.
of doing an act comprised in the copyright in a work or other subject-matter" (emphasis added). 
The second criterion is that the doing of that act otherwise comprised in the copyright is rendered 
not an infringement by reason of the operation of one or more of the exculpatory provisions then 
set out. (The listed provisions do not include the general fair-dealing exculpations in ss 40, 41 and 
42 of the Act.) 
The first criterion in s 116A(7) for reliance upon the permitted purpose provisions which are an 
answer  to  what  would  otherwise  be  a  claim  under  s 116A  thus  in  terms  links  the  use  of  a 
circumvention device to the doing of one or more of the acts enumerated in s 31 of the Act (where 
these are done in relation to a work) and in ss 85-88 (where these are done in relation to subject-
matter other than a work). 
If the construction of the definition for which Sony contends were accepted despite the linkage 
specified in s 116A(7) between the use of a circumvention device and the central provisions of 
ss 31 and 85-88 of the Act, the permitted purpose provisions would risk stultification. The facts of 
the  present  case  are  in  point.  The  use  of  Mr Stevens'  mod  chip  in  order  to  circumvent  the 
protections provided by (a) the access code on a CD-ROM in which a PlayStation game is stored 
and (b) the boot ROM device contained within the PlayStation console cannot be said to be for the 
"purpose"  of  reproducing  a  computer  game  within  the  sense  of  s 31  of  the  Act.  Any  such 
reproduction will  already have been made through the ordinary process of  "burning" the CD-
ROM. The mod chip is utilised for a different purpose, namely to access the reproduced computer 
program and thereafter visually to apprehend the result of the exercise of the functions of the 
program.23 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ explained that in ‘choosing between a 
relatively broad and a relatively narrow construction of legislation, it is desirable to 
take into account its penal character.’ While this was not a criminal proceeding the 
judges stated that the potential for criminal sanction called for caution in ‘accepting 
any loose, albeit ‘practical’’construction of the section.24  They added that: 
……….. in construing a definition which focuses on a device designed to prevent or inhibit the 
infringement of copyright, it is important to avoid an overbroad construction which would extend 
the copyright monopoly rather than match it. A defect in the construction rejected by Sackville J is 
that its effect is to extend the copyright monopoly by including within the definition not only 
technological  protection  measures  which  stop  the  infringement  of  copyright,  but  also  devices 
which prevent the carrying out of conduct which does not infringe copyright and is not otherwise 
unlawful. One example of that conduct is playing in Australia a program lawfully acquired in the 
United States. It was common ground in the courts below and in argument in this Court that this 
act would not of itself have been an infringement. [Footnotes omitted]25
In disposing of the issue and settling the meaning of the word ‘inhibit’ Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ explained:
… Sony contended that, unless the term "inhibit" had the meaning given by the Full Court, it was 
otiose, adding nothing to "prevent". One meaning of "inhibit" indeed is "prevent". However, it may 
be taken that "inhibit" is used in the definition of "technological protection measure" in one of its 
weaker senses, while still necessarily attached to an act of infringement. One such sense has been 
given above with respect to acts of secondary infringement by dealing in an article created by an 
act of primary infringement. Further, the operation of a copy control mechanism to impair the 
quality or limit the quantity of a reproduction may be said to hinder the act of infringement. In that 
regard, there is a legislative antecedent in s 296 of the 1988 UK Act. This, it will be recalled, 
spoke of devices or means intended "to impair" the quality of copies made. In the present case, the 
23 Ibid at [39]-[43]
24 Ibid at [45]
25 Ibid at [47]
Sony device  does  not  interfere  with  the  making  of  a  perfect  copy of  Sony's  copyright  in  its 
computer program or cinematograph film.26
They also noted that the definition of TPM was a compromise between the respective 
interests and that “there was a reluctance to give to copyright owners a form of broad 
“access control” and “this reluctance is manifest in the inclusion in the definition of 
“technological  protection  measure”  of  the  concept  of  prevention  or  inhibition  of 
infringement.”27  
McHugh J  explained that  ‘a  device is  a device that is  "designed ...  to ...  inhibit" 
copyright if the device functions, ….so as to make the doing of an act of copyright 
infringement - not impossible - but more difficult than it would be if the device did 
not operate’28 He went on to further explain this notion by way of examples:  
This interpretation does not render the term "inhibit" redundant because it applies to at least 
two  categories  of  devices  that  do  not  have  an  absolute  preventative  effect  on  copyright 
infringement. Thus, there are protective devices that regulate a user's access, not to the work 
itself, but to the appliance through which works are accessed. For example, "device binding" 
is a measure through which the decryption key of a work is linked to the "unique identifier" of 
the computer of a person who is licensed to download and copy a work. The work may only 
be downloaded and saved (and thus, copied) onto a computer with this identifier. The fact that 
access  to  the  work  is  available  solely  by  use  of  a  decryption  key  that  is  linked  to  the 
computer's identifier does not make it impossible for another user of the same computer - who 
has not been licensed to reproduce the material - to download and save the work. Nonetheless, 
in disenabling the access of all other computers to the work, "device binding" mechanisms 
function to make it more difficult for users - who are not licensed to download the work - to 
have access to an appliance that will enable the copying and infringement of copyright in the 
work. In this way, "device binding" inhibits, but does not prevent, copyright infringement. 
Other devices are designed to make it impossible to do an act of copyright infringement by a 
particular method or methods, but are ineffective to prevent the doing of the same infringing 
act  by  other,  more  complex,  methods.  Online  access  controls  are  an  example.  They  are 
measures  that  decrypt  a  work  that  is  delivered  to  the  computer  through  the  Internet  - 
"streamed" - when it is delivered to the computer. The work is then immediately re-encrypted, 
so as to enable only a small portion of the work to be decrypted at any given time. The result 
is that the work cannot be digitally copied onto the computer to which it is being delivered. 
However,  the re-encryption of  the work,  after  it  has  been delivered and played, does not 
restrain the user from reproducing the work on other recording devices while the work is 
being played. In making it impossible to do an act of copyright infringement (ie reproduction) 
using one method, but not making it impossible to do the same act of copyright infringement 
using a more tedious method, online access controls make it more difficult to reproduce the 
work.29 [Footnotes omitted]
McHugh  J  concluded  by  saying  that  ‘if  the  definition  of  TPM  were  to  be  read 
expansively, so as to include devices designed to prevent access to material, with no 
inherent or necessary link to the prevention or inhibition of infringement of copyright, 
this would expand the ambit of the definition beyond that naturally indicated by the 
text’ of the Act.’ 30 
26 Ibid at [55] See also [51]-[52]
27 Ibid at [49]
28 Ibid at [139]
29 Ibid at [139]-[143]
30 Ibid at [143]
Kirby J  explained that as Parliament had chosen such an elaborate and a specific 
definition a court should be careful to respect this design. He added that the ‘difficulty 
with Sony's interpretation is that it challenges the very assumption upon which the 
definition of TPM in terms of "devices" would operate to have the designated effect, 
namely the prevention or inhibition of the infringement of copyright.’31 He explained: 
The inclusion of the word "inhibit", in the context of a focus upon a self-operating device, 
does not alter this conclusion. A strict interpretation does not deprive the term "inhibit" in s 
10(1) of meaningful content. That word still has work to do in a number of contexts that are 
not covered by the word "prevent". For example, it will apply to a protective device which 
regulates access to the mechanism that provides access to a work, rather than access to the 
work itself. Such a device will not prevent infringement in all cases. This is because a device 
limiting  access  to  a  work  does  not  prevent  infringing  copies  being  made  once  access  is 
legitimately achieved. However, by restricting access to the work in the first place, such a 
device  makes  infringement  more  difficult.  Significantly,  such  an  inhibition  operates 
prospectively;  the  infringement  against  which  the  device  is  designed  to  protect  occurs 
subsequent to the operation of the protection device in its ordinary course. … Secondly, a 
device that prevents infringement by a particular method, but which is ineffective to protect 
against infringement by another more complex or involved method, is a device that will not be 
covered by the term "prevent" in s 10(1). This is because infringement will still be possible, 
through the more complex method, notwithstanding the operation of the device. However, by 
making infringement more difficult (say by preventing a common or easily available method 
of  infringement),  such a device can be seen to inhibit  infringement in the technical sense 
required by the definition. This further demonstrates the utility of the inclusion of the term 
"inhibit" in s 10(1), consistent with the strict interpretation that I favour. 
Had it been the purpose of the Parliament, by the enactment of the Digital Agenda Act, to 
create a right to control access generally, it had the opportunity to say so. It even had overseas 
precedents upon which it  could draw. The Australian Government was pressed to provide 
protection  for  all  devices  that  "control  access".  This  is  evident  in  the  definition  of  TPM 
suggested  to  the  Australian  Parliamentary  Committee  by  the  International  Intellectual 
Property Alliance. Such a definition would effectively have mirrored the provision adopted by 
the Congress of the United States in the  Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. By the 
time the Australian definition of TPM was enacted, the United States Act had been in force for 
two years. Nevertheless, the propounded definition of wider ambit was not accepted. Instead, 
in Australia, the Parliament chose to focus its definition upon protection from infringement of 
copyright as such. 
The preference inherent in the Australian Act has been viewed as one which "favours the use 
of protected works", by limiting the operation of TPMs in terms of control over infringement 
of  copyright  rather  than  a  potentially  broader  control  over  access.  When  the  competing 
legislation  of  other  jurisdictions,  giving  effect  to  the  relevant  international  treaties,  is 
contrasted, it appears clear that the distinctive statutory formula adopted in Australia was a 
deliberate one. [Footnotes omitted] 32
Kirby J reinforced his interpretation by stating that:
Avoiding over-wide operation: There is an additional reason for preferring the more confined 
interpretation of the definition of TPM in the Copyright Act. This is because the wider view 
urged  by  Sony  would  have  the  result  of  affording  Sony,  and  other  rights  holders  in  its 
position, a de facto control over access to copyrighted works or materials that would permit 
the achievement of economic ends additional to, but different from, those ordinarily protected 
by copyright law. If the present case is taken as an illustration, Sony's interpretation would 
permit the effective enforcement, through a technological measure, of the division of global 
markets  designated  by  Sony.  It  would  have  the  effect  of  imposing,  at  least  potentially, 
31 Ibid at [204]
32 Ibid at [204]-[209]
differential price structures in those separate markets. In short, it would give Sony broader 
powers over pricing of its products in its self-designated markets than the  Copyright Act in 
Australia would ordinarily allow
Upholding fundamental rights: A further reason, not  wholly unconnected with the last,  is 
relevant to the choice to be made in selecting between the competing interpretations of the 
definition of TPM. …The Full Court's broader view gives an undifferentiated operation to the 
provisions of s 116A that clearly impinges on what would otherwise be the legal rights of the 
owner of a Sony CD ROM and PlayStation console to copy the same for limited purposes and 
to use and modify the same for legitimate reasons, as in the pursuit of that person's ordinary 
rights  as  the  owner  of  chattels  ….   Take,  for  example,  the  case  earlier  mentioned  of  a 
purchaser  of  a  Sony  CD ROM  in  Japan  or  the  United  States  who  found,  on  arrival  in 
Australia, that he or she could not play the game on a Sony PlayStation console purchased in 
Australia.  In  the case postulated,  there is  no obvious copyright  reason why the purchaser 
should not be entitled to copy the CD ROM and modify the console in such a way as to enjoy 
his  or  her  lawfully  acquired  property  without  inhibition.  Yet,  on  Sony's  theory  of  the 
definition of TPM in s 10(1) of the Copyright Act, it is able to enforce its division of global 
markets by a device ostensibly limited to the protection of Sony against the infringement of its 
copyright. 
The provisions of the Australian Constitution affording the power to make laws with respect 
to copyright operate in a constitutional and legal setting that normally upholds the rights of the 
individual to deal with his or her property as that individual thinks fit. In that setting, absent 
the  provision of  just  terms,  the  individual  is  specifically  entitled not  to  have  such  rights 
infringed by federal legislation in a way that amounts to an impermissible inhibition upon 
those rights constituting an acquisition. This is not the case in which to explore the limits that 
exist in the powers of the Australian Parliament, by legislation purporting to deal with the 
subject matter of copyright, to encumber the enjoyment of lawfully acquired chattel property 
in  the supposed furtherance  of  the rights  of  copyright  owners.  However,  limits  there  are. 
[Footnotes omitted]33 
The legislative option: An additional consideration for avoiding reversal of the  Sony rule in 
the United States Supreme Court was mentioned by Breyer J in the recent opinion to which I 
have referred. This was, as the decision in Sony in that Court had earlier recognised, that "the 
legislative option remains available. Courts are less well suited than Congress to the task of 
'accommodat[ing]  fully  the  varied  permutations  of  competing  interests  that  are  inevitably 
implicated by such new technology.'"  In the Australian context, the inevitability of further 
legislation on the protection of technology with TPMs was made clear by reference to the 
provisions of, and some legislation already enacted for, the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement.  Provisions  in  that  Agreement,  and likely future legislation,  impinge upon the 
subject matters of this appeal. Almost certainly they will require the attention of the Australian 
Parliament in the foreseeable future.  [Footnotes omitted]34
The Rise of the Consumer Interest
While copyright law and policy has long talked in terms of copyright owners and 
users the Stevens decision marks a significant shift in terms of reasoning. In this case 
the interests of the consumer as owner of lawfully acquired chattels (not as a user of 
copyright material) are balanced against the interests of the copyright owner.  And in 
this instance the Court limits the power and scope of copyright ownership vis a vis the 
consumer as chattel (console and games) owner.  This clash of the respective rights to 
33 Ibid at [213]–[216]
34 Ibid. at [222]-[225]
private property shows how copyright litigation in a similar context in the future will 
need to assess and address the competing principles at play.  
The Effect of Australian –US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) on the Stevens v  
Sony Decision
By including the words “prevents or inhibits infringement of copyright” the existing 
definition of TPM is said to be narrower in effect than a provision that “controls 
access” without any reference to copyright infringement. At the time of enactment 
submissions were made by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) to 
the House of Representatives Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (LACA) 
that the definition of a TPM in the form of an “access control” should not be linked to 
copyright infringement.35 It was argued that access controls should be reinforced by 
anti-circumvention  law  even  if  they  do  not  prevent  or  inhibit  infringement  of 
copyright. The “real world” example provided by the IIPA to highlight the point was 
that of having a lock to prevent opening a door to a house (the access control) which 
contained a book which upon entry I could read without infringing copyright.36  This 
view  was  said  to  have  been  endorsed  in  the  Digital  Millennium  Copyright  Act  
(DMCA) in the US. Critics of this approach had argued that such a broad ranging 
definition of TPM introduced a new form of economic exploitation over information 
called an “access right”. At no point in time did the IIPA submission suggest that an 
access  control  should  regulate  “use”  of  copyright  material  that  had  already  been 
copied.  As well, the IIPA argued on the basis that the law reform being undertaken at 
that time related to the WCT and WPPT – both treaties dealing with copyright and 
convened  by  the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organisation.   The  IIPA’s  preferred 
definition of an effective TPM is the same as the one offered in art 17.4.7 of AUSFTA 
and the DMCA.
 
The AUSFTA Obligations – Already Enacted 
The AUSFTA has  already been  implemented in  part  through the US Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) which came into effect on 1 January 2005. 
Article 17.4.1 of AUSFTA obliges Australia to enact laws allowing copyright owners 
the right to prohibit all types of reproduction, in any manner or form, permanent or 
temporary. The US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) amends the 
definition  of  ‘material  form’  and ‘copy’  in  section  10  of  the  Act  and  creates  an 
exception to infringement where the reproduction is made as part  of the technical 
process of using a non-infringing copy of the copyright material  (see ss 43B and 
111B).  The  critical  difference  being  that  temporary  reproduction  of  a  whole  or 
substantial part of a computer program (game) or film (game) in RAM generated from 
an infringing copy of the copyright material will be unlawful. This will most likely 
mean that the arguments made by Sony concerning reproduction in RAM will  be 
35 S Metalitz , 7.10.1999, pages 3-5
  http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/digitalagenda/submiss.htm
36 S Metalitz, Public Hearing 21.10.1999 pages 176-177
 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/digitalagenda/pubhear.htm
upheld in the case of infringing material.  The decision would remain intact in relation 
to non-infringing material namely games purchased overseas and possibly back up 
copies. 
Will the Further Changes Required by AUSFTA mean Regional Access Coding 
is now a TPM?
The clear intent of the AUSFTA evidenced in art 17.4.7 is to bring Australian anti-
circumvention  law  into  line  with  that  in  the  US  through  making  actual  anti-
circumvention of an access control unlawful37 and moving the definition of TPM from 
one that “prevents or inhibits infringement of copyright” to one that “controls access” 
to protected subject matter.38 
Art 17.4.7 of AUSFTA requires that:
7. (a) In order to provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that authors, performers, and producers of 
phonograms use in connection with the exercise of their rights and that restrict unauthorised 
acts in respect of their works, performances, and phonograms, each Party shall provide that 
any person who:
(i)  knowingly,  or  having  reasonable  grounds  to  know,  circumvents  without  authority  any 
effective technological  measure that  controls  access  to  a  protected work,  performance,  or 
phonogram, or other subject matter; or
(ii) manufactures, imports, distributes, offers to the public, provides, or otherwise traffics in 
devices, products, or components, or offers to the public, or provides services that:
(A) are promoted, advertised, or marketed for the purpose of circumvention of any effective 
technological measure;
(B) have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent any 
effective technological measure; or
(C) are primarily designed, produced, or performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating 
the circumvention of any effective technological measure,
shall  be liable and subject to the remedies specified in Article  17.11.13. Each Party shall 
provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied where any person is found to have 
engaged wilfully and for the purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain in any of the 
above activities. Each Party may provide that such criminal procedures and penalties do not 
37 On the possible exceptions see: AUSFTA art 17.4.7 (e) & (f).
38 “There are two elements involved in implementing the TPM obligation. The first element is the 
development of amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 to ensure compliance with Article 17.4.7. The 
second element involves a determination of whether there are additional exceptions to TPM liability 
that  would be  appropriate  for  Australia  to  create.  The Attorney-General’s  Department  is  currently 
undertaking the first element. At the request of the Attorney-General, the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (the Committee) will undertake the second 
element. The Committee announced this reference on Wednesday 24 August 2005. Information about 
the  reference  can  be  accessed  at   http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/previnq.htm”.  AG's 
Newsletter  August  2005   <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/enewsCopyrightHome.nsf 
/Page/eNews_Issue_37_-_August_2005>.
apply  to  a  non-profit  library,  archive,  educational  institution,  or  public  non-commercial 
broadcasting entity.
(b) Effective technological measure means any technology, device, or component that, in the 
normal course of its operation, controls access to a protected work, performance, phonogram, 
or other protected subject matter, or protects any copyright.39  
If we presume that a link to copyright infringement will not be required (as explained 
below  that  now  seems  unlikely),  the  critical  question  concerning  the  continued 
relevance of the Stevens v Sony reasoning will be whether the amended Australian law 
will equate “access” with “use”.  If “controls access” means for example controlling 
access  to  copyright  subject  matter  before any  act  of  using,  reproduction  or 
communication occurs then the  Stevens v Sony reasoning will remain important, as 
regional access coding does not “control access” before the relevant act. It does not 
stop someone being able to access the copyright subject matter for the purpose of 
using,  copying  or  communicating  it.  This  approach  fits  well  with  the  argument 
proposed by the IIPA that access should be decoupled from the activity that goes on 
after access is achieved; access is merely the lock on the door.  It does not concern 
itself  with any activity (e.g.  use)40 that  will  occur after  access has been achieved. 
However if  “controls access” means for example the right to control use or playing of 
a game on a PlayStation after access to copyright subject matter has been achieved 
then the Stevens v Sony reasoning would be of limited application.41  
39 Consider:  DMCA s 1201 (a) (1) (2) & (3)
(2) No person shall  manufacture,  import,  offer  to  the  public,  provide,  or  otherwise  traffic  in  any 
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that— (A) is primarily designed or 
produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a 
work protected under this title; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or 
(C) is  marketed  by  that  person  or  another  acting  in  concert  with  that  person  with  that  person’s 
knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title. 
(3) As used in this subsection— (A) to “circumvent a technological measure” means to descramble a 
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or 
impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner; and 
(B) a technological measure “effectively controls access to a work” if the measure, in the ordinary 
course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the 
authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work. 
40 On one view it might be argued that you have not achieved access to a PlayStation game if you 
cannot play it on the console you have purchased.  It is hard to justify such an approach as it ignores 
the fact that once access is established a consumer can use modified technology to play the game. If 
they could not achieve access to the game in the first place there would be nothing that could be done 
to enable use. By trying to draw the legality of the modified technology into the definition of access the 
proponents of this view are extending the notion of access control (having its origins in copyright law) 
to a broader right to control use (having significant impact on consumer law). 
41 On this interpretation see, Sony v Gamemasters 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999):
“39.  Defendant  concedes  in  its  opposition  papers  that  "[t]he  Game  Enhancer  makes  temporary 
modifications  to  the  [PlayStation]  computer  program  ...  [c]hanging  these  codes  with  the  Game 
Enhancer does not alter the underlying software made by SONY." (Def. Opp. at 6). Based upon the 
declarations before this Court, the Game Enhancer's distinguishing feature appears to be its ability to 
allow consumers to play import  or  non-territorial  SCEA video games. As discussed above, SCEA 
specifically designed the PlayStation console to access only those games with data codes that match 
The very great fear is that as software inhabits an enormous number of the consumer 
goods we purchase in this  day and age there is  tremendous scope for embedding 
TPMs in all kinds of products and thereby radically redefining the parameters of a 
sale of goods or services.  If TPMs as protected by anti-circumvention law can be 
used to structure the scope/usability of the product through code or technology then 
what the consumer is buying may not be readily apparent and worse still, may not 
allow choice of or interoperability with other accessories.42
If the definition of a TPM is to move from “prevent or inhibit copyright infringement” 
to  “controls  access”  meaning  “controls  use”  then  we have  not  only  legislated  an 
access right in our copyright law but we have also legislated a far reaching right to 
control  and  define  consumer  use.   This  would  be  better  placed  in  our  consumer 
legislation and assessed in that light  than articulated and justified as an aspect of 
copyright law. The AUSFTA in essence acknowledges such a point in art 17.4.7 (d).43
As Australia has moved to open up the flow of goods and services across borders in 
line  with  free  trade  principles  through  the  removal  of  the  restrictions  on  parallel 
importation  of  copyright  material  in  certain  circumstances  it  seems  odd  that  the 
AUSFTA  should  be  interpreted  as  promoting  the  reintroduction  of  such  barriers 
through technology. The barrier that law has taken away AUSFTA is threatening to 
reintroduce through technological regulation.  
Kirby  J  in  Stevens  v  Sony questions  whether  such  an  enactment  would  be 
constitutional.44 Parliament would act to legislate these amendments (pursuant to the 
Australian  Federal  Constitution)  under  the  intellectual  property  power  s  51  (18) 
and/or the external affairs power s  51 (29) (implementing the WCT45,  WPPT and 
the geographical location of the game console itself. The Game Enhancer circumvents the mechanism 
on the PlayStation console that ensures the console operates only when encrypted data is read from an 
authorized CD-ROM. (Pltf's Reply at 7). Thus, at this stage, the Game Enhancer appears to be a device 
whose  primary  function is  to  circumvent  "a  technological  measure  (or  a  protection afforded  by  a 
technological  measure)  that  effectively  controls  access  to  a  system  protected  by  a  registered 
copyright...." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A). (Emphasis added)” See also Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne 
and  Heydon  JJ  in  Stevens  v  Kabushiki  Kaisha  Sony  Computer  Entertainment [2005]  HCA 58  at 
[43]where they say “The mod chip is utilised for a different purpose, namely to access the reproduced 
computer program and thereafter visually to apprehend the result of the exercise of the functions of the 
program.” (Emphasis added).
42 The Chamberlain Group Inc v Skylink Technologies Inc  381 F.3d 1178 at 1203, 1204 (Fed Cir. 
2004); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,  387 F.3d 522; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
27422 (6th Cir 2004);  B Fitzgerald, “The Playstation Mod Chip: A Technological Guarantee of the 
Digital  Consumer’s  Liberty  or  Copyright  Menace/Circumvention  Device?” 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp An earlier and shorter version of this paper 
appears in (2005) 10 Media and Arts Law Review 89 
43 AUSFTA art 17.4.7  (d): Each Party shall provide that a violation of a measure implementing this 
paragraph is a separate civil or criminal offence and independent of any infringement that might occur 
under the Party’s copyright law.
44 At [216]
45 E.g. Art 11 WCT:  Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in 
connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict 
acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.
AUSFTA)  with  other  powers  such  as  the  trade  and  commerce  power  or  the 
corporations  power  having  potential  relevance.  Any  inherent  limits  found  in  the 
intellectual property power (as yet undefined by the High Court)46 or the guarantee of 
compensation (“just terms”) for acquisition of property under s 51 (31) would be the 
obvious  constitutional  limits.47  Section  51  (31)  would  have  particular  relevance 
where property rights to chattels have already vested and the AUSFTA amendments 
purport to reduce the value (through functionality) of such chattels to the benefit of 
the copyright owner.48  
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs (LACA) 
In  July  2005,  the  Commonwealth  Attorney-General  asked  the  House  of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (LACA) to 
consider  what  exceptions  should be drawn to the  modified liability  scheme to  be 
enacted pursuant to the AUSFTA. The LACA held public hearings and received 64 
submissions from interested organisations and individuals, and released its Review of  
Technological Protection Measures Exceptions Report in February 2006.
Article  17.4.7(e)  requires  that  exceptions  to  the  anti-circumvention  provisions  are 
limited to:
(i) non-infringing reverse engineering activities with regard to a lawfully obtained copy 
of a computer program, carried out in good faith with respect to particular elements 
of that computer program that have not been readily available to the person engaged 
in  those  activities,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  achieving  interoperability  of  an 
independently created computer program with other programs;
(ii) non-infringing  good  faith  activities,  carried  out  by  an  appropriately  qualified 
researcher who has lawfully obtained a copy, unfixed performance, or display of a 
work, performance, or phonogram and who has made a good faith effort to obtain 
authorisation  for  such  activities,  to  the  extent  necessary  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
identifying and analysing flaws and vulnerabilities of technologies for scrambling 
and descrambling of information;
(iii) the inclusion of a component or part for the sole purpose of preventing the access of 
minors to inappropriate online content in a technology, product, service, or device 
that itself is not prohibited under the measures implementing sub-paragraph (a)(ii);
(iv) non-infringing good faith activities that are authorised by the owner of a computer, 
computer system, or computer network for the sole purpose of testing, investigating, 
or correcting the security of that computer, computer system, or computer network;
(v) non-infringing activities for the sole purpose of identifying and disabling a capability 
to  carry  out  undisclosed  collection  or  dissemination  of  personally  identifying 
information reflecting the online activities of a natural person in a way that has no 
other effect on the ability of any person to gain access to any work;
(vi) lawfully  authorised  activities  carried  out  by  government  employees,  agents,  or 
contractors  for  law  enforcement,  intelligence,  essential  security,  or  similar 
governmental purposes;
46 See: Grain Pool of WA v The Commonwealth [2000] HCA 14 at f/n 218 per Kirby J
47 See further:  B Fitzgerald, “The Playstation Mod Chip: A Technological Guarantee of the Digital 
Consumer’s  Liberty  or  Copyright  Menace/Circumvention  Device?” 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp An earlier and shorter version of this paper 
appears in (2005) 10 Media and Arts Law Review 89; B Fitzgerald, “Unjust Enrichment As A Principle 
of  Australian  Constitutionalism”  (1995)  available  at 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp  
48 Consider: Kirby J in Stevens v Sony at [216]
(vii) access  by  a  non-profit  library,  archive,  or  educational  institution  to  a  work, 
performance, or  phonogram not otherwise available to it,  for the sole purpose of 
making acquisition decisions; and
(viii) non-infringing uses of a work, performance, or phonogram in a particular class of 
works, performances, or phonograms, when an actual or likely adverse impact on 
those non-infringing uses is credibly demonstrated in a legislative or administrative 
review or proceeding; provided that any such review or proceeding is conducted at 
least once every four years from the date of conclusion of such review or proceeding.
The terms of reference given to the LACA requested it to consider if any exceptions 
should be introduced based on Article 17.4.7(e)(viii), in addition to the exceptions in 
Article 17.4.7(e)(i)-(viii). The Committee was asked specifically to consider:
a. the activities of libraries, archives and other cultural institutions
b. the activities of educational and research institutions
c. the use of databases by researchers (in particular those contemplated by recommendation 28.3 
of the Australian Law Reform Commission Report on Gene Patenting)
d. activities conducted by, or on behalf of, people with disabilities
e. the activities of open source software developers, and
f. activities conducted in relation to regional coding of digital technologies.
“A particular class of works, performances, or phonograms”
The  Committee  did  not  consider  itself  to  be  in  a  position  to  provide  a  settled 
definition of the phrase ‘a particular class of works, performances, or phonograms’ 
however it did indicate that it was not bound by the “narrow” interpretation that the 
US Copyright Office had given the phrase.49 Further the Committee noted that there 
were  a  number  of  factors  which  could  identify  ‘a  particular  class  of  works, 
performances, or phonograms’, including:50
• Attributes of works, performances, or phonograms;
• Reference to the relevant category of copyright material as set out in the Copyright Act 1968 – 
for example literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, performances, and sound recordings;
• Attributes of the form or media in which works, performances, or phonograms are distributed 
or stored;
• The presence of particular TPMs on or with works, performances, or phonograms;
• Identified users  of  works,  performances,  or  phonograms,  or  categories  of  users  of  works, 
performances, or phonograms;
• The purpose of uses of works, performances, or phonograms; and
• The purpose of proposed circumvention of TPMs.
The  Committee  suggested  that  ‘a  particular  class  of  works,  performances,  or 
phonograms’ could be identified using a combination of these factors, but cautioned 
that there should be sufficient identification of the copyright material itself:
any formulation of ‘a particular class of works, performances, or phonograms’ should have a 
proper grounding in the works, performances or phonograms concerned. Regardless of the 
specific factor or factors that, apart from information about the copyright material itself, are 
utilised to formulate ‘a particular class of works, performances, or phonograms’, there should 
be a sufficient level of detail about the copyright material concerned.51
49 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 66-69.
50 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 69.
51 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 69.
Definition of ETM
The  Committee  was  not  asked  to  consider  the  content  of  any  new  definition  of 
‘effective  technological  measure’  (ETM),  which  has  not  yet  been  determined  in 
Australian  legislation.  The  Committee  found  that  the  lack  of  context  and  the 
uncertainty of the definition “significantly complicated the work of the Committee, 
particularly its central task of assessing additional proposed exceptions to the liability 
scheme.”52 
The Committee  noted that  a  broad definition of  ‘effective technological  measure’ 
would necessarily supersede the High Court’s decision in Stevens v Sony, and that the 
Government must consider both constitutional limits and broader policy issues in its 
construction of  an Australian definition.53 While  the Committee  was not  asked to 
comment on the definition of ETMs, it did recommend that the balance struck by the 
Copyright Act between users and owners of copyright material should be maintained 
upon implementation of the AUSFTA;54 in other words, the new legislation should act 
to strengthen protections available to the copyright owner, but not create broad new 
access rights at the expense of users. The Committee accordingly drew a distinction 
between technological means to protect copyright and other technological measures 
which may claim or protect unrelated rights. In doing so, the Committee considered 
the  introductory  words  to  Article  17.4.7(a)55,  which  provide  that  the  anti-
circumvention provisions are to be enacted
[i]n  order  to  provide  adequate  legal  protection  and  effective  legal  remedies  against  the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that authors, performers, and producers of 
phonograms use in connection with the exercise of their rights and that restrict unauthorised 
acts in respect of their works, performances, and phonograms.
The Committee  relied on evidence provided by the Attorney-General’s Department, 
which explained that Article 17.4 “deals only with rights comprising copyright”, and 
that “the definition of an ETM refers to technology that protects any copyright, not 
that  protects  any  right”.56 Accordingly,  the  Committee  recommended  that  the 
definition of ETM “clearly require a direct link between access control and copyright 
protection”.57 The  Committee  then  recommended  that  “access  control  measures 
should  be  related  to  the  protection  of  copyright,  rather  than  to  the  restriction  of 
competition in markets for non-copyright goods and services”.58
 
Region Coding
The  Committee  considered  whether  region  coding  for  both  electronic  games  and 
DVDs should fall within the definition of TPMs under the new scheme. With respect 
to  console  games,  the  Committee  was  not  persuaded  that  access  controls  which 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate copies of games were inseparable from 
52 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 3.
53 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 11.
54 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 14.
55 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 22-23.
56 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 23, quoting Mr Mark Jennings, 
Transcript of Evidence, 5 December 2005, pp 25-26.
57 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 26.
58 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 31.
access  controls  which  enforced region codes.59 The Committee  also  accepted  that 
there  was  doubt  as  to  whether  region  codes  were  designed  purely  for  television 
standard compliance,  or whether there were significant  market control reasons for 
their use.60 
The Committee dealt with region coding of DVDs at greater length. It first noted, 
similarly  to  games,  region  coding  of  DVDs  was  not  inseparable  from  copyright 
control measures embedded in DVDs and DVD players.61 The Committee then noted 
that it is not an infringement of copyright to play discs from other regions, and that it 
would be permissible for Australian residents to import  both foreign DVDs and a 
foreign  DVD player  to  watch  them on,  but  considered  that  this  would  not  be  a 
reasonable option.62 The Committee also noted that the number of people who would 
be impacted by region coding was likely to be significant.63 The Committee concluded 
that
it is ludicrous to envisage a situation where an individual’s only option to use legally acquired 
genuine non-zone 4 DVDs will  be to  purchase a  DVD player tuned to each of  the other 
regions, rather than have the ability to modify a DVD player to access all regions.
The Committee  recommended that  region coding TPMs “be specifically  excluded 
from the definition of ‘effective technological measure’”.64 However, the Committee 
noted  that  the  definition  of  ETM  would  ultimately  be  a  policy  decision  for  the 
Government,  and recommended,  in  the alternative,  that  exceptions  be  granted for 
region coding TPM circumvention wherever the criteria under Article 17.4.7(e)(viii) 
are met.65 
Other recommendations
The  Committee  recommended  that  an  exception  should  be  drawn  for  TPM 
circumvention  for  the  purpose  of  making  back-up  copies  of  computer  programs, 
mirroring the exceptions to copyright infringement in s 47C, noting that the criteria 
under Article 17.4.7(e)(viii) and (f) appear to be met.66 Due to the fact that computer 
games like those in  Stevens v Sony are not only computer programs, but are  also 
considered to be cinematograph films,67 it is unclear to what extent such an exception 
would operate in relation to the console game industry. The Committee noted that an 
exception to TPM circumvention for backup copies of other copyright material would 
not be feasible unless a similar exception is created to copyright infringement, and 
recommended  that  should  backup  become  a  non-infringing  use,  the  Government 
should investigate creating a TPM circumvention exception.68
The  Committee  noted  that,  based  on  evidence  from  the  Attorney-General’s 
Department, technological measures restricting access to material  not protected by 
59 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 36.
60 Ibid.
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66 LACA, Review of Technological Protection Measures Exceptions, 95.
67 Sega Enterprises Ltd  v Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd (1998) 39 IPR 577
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copyright  (public  domain  material)  would  not  be  considered  to  be  ETMs.  The 
Committee noted, however, that “copyright owners should not be able to obtain  de 
facto protection for non-copyright material by bundling it with copyright material in 
mixed works”.69 The Committee accordingly recommended that an exception should 
be created “to allow for circumvention of TPMs for access to mixed works consisting 
of  both  copyright  material  and  non-copyright  material  where  the  amount  of  non-
copyright material in the work is substantial”.70
The  Committee  also  recommended  that  the  “exclusion  or  limitation  of  permitted 
exceptions  by  agreement  should  be  prohibited  under  the  liability  scheme”.71 The 
Committee considered that the
Widespread  use  of  exclusionary  or  limiting  agreements,  particularly  when  presented  to 
copyright users as virtual  faits accomplis in the form of end user licence agreements, could 
easily render the very concept of permitted exceptions meaningless.72
This  is  an  important  statement  of  principle  given  the  recent  8th Circuit  Court  of 
Appeals  decision  in  Davidson  v  Internet  Gateway73 (more  commonly  known  as 
Blizzard v BNetD), which held that bypassing the cd-key validity check on Blizzard’s 
online games in order to create an interoperable gaming server violated the DMCA, 
and that a fair use defence was not available because the defendants’ fair use rights 
were  waived  in  the  shrinkwrap  and  clickwrap  EULAs  and  Terms  of  Service.  In 
Australia, the ability to engage in reverse engineering of software for interoperability 
purposes  in  certain  circumstances  is  an  exception  to  copyright  infringement,  and 
cannot be waived by contract.74 There is a similar exception to the anti-circumvention 
provisions  in  relation  to  reverse  engineering  of  software,  but  it  is  not  similarly 
protected  from  exclusion  by  contract.75 The  report  by  the  LACA  Committee,  if 
followed, would ensure that the ability to reverse-engineer and create interoperable 
products in Australia remains protected.
The Committee also recommended that:
• an exception be created for TPM circumvention for government activities 
of  the  Australian  Tax  Office  and  the  Office  of  Film  and  Literature 
Classification;76
• exceptions for TPM circumvention for reverse engineering of software for 
interoperability purposes;  for software installed involuntarily or without 
acceptance, or where the user has no awareness of the TPM; for security 
testing of software; and for circumvention to maintain individual privacy 
online;77
• the express exceptions in Article 17.4.7(e)(i)-(vii) should be drafted so as 
to not limit their scope in any way;78
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• the  term  ‘manufactures’  in  Article  17.4.7(a)(ii)  should  be  clarified  to 
permit  the  non-commercial  creation  of  circumvention  devices  for  the 
purpose of utilising exceptions permitted under Article 17.4.7(e)(v), (vii), 
and (viii);79
• the government should devise a “workable and adequate solution” to the 
problem of  access  to  circumvention devices and services  to  enable the 
proper exercise of exceptions under Article 17.4.7(e)(v), (vii), and (viii);80
• the  government  should  maintain  the  existing  permitted  purposes  and 
exceptions in the Copyright Act 1968;81
• an exception to liability for TPM circumvention should be created for the 
investigation of  copyright  infringement  of  licensed computer  programs, 
subject  to  a  court  order,  where  the  court  is  satisfied  that  there  are 
reasonable grounds for the investigation;82
• exceptions  should  be  created  for  making  backup  copies  of  computer 
programs, interoperability between computer programs, correcting errors 
in computer programs, and interoperability between computer programs 
and data;83
• the government should “monitor the potential adverse impact of threats of 
legal  action  being  made  against  legitimate  researchers  in  Australia 
conducting research into encryption, access, copy control measures, and 
other issues relating to computer security”;84
• the government should “monitor the potential adverse impact in Australia 
of compilations of lists of websites being blocked by commercial filtering 
software”;85
• if the use, exploitation, and modification of ‘abandonware’ becomes non-
infringing, the Government should consider introducing a corresponding 
exception to TPM circumvention;86
• exceptions be created for the provision of copyright material to members 
of Parliament, and the use of copyright material for the services of the 
Crown;87
• “if any activities for assisting students with disabilities outside of Part VB 
of  the  Copyright  Act  1968  become  non-infringing  in  future”,  the 
Government  should  consider  introducing  a  corresponding  TPM 
circumvention exception;88
• exceptions be created for reproduction and communication for educational 
institutions, and institutions assisting those with a print disability;89
• devices classified as accessibility aids or for those with a print disability 
should be exempted from the TPM liability scheme;90
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• exceptions  should  be  created  for  libraries,  archives,  and  cultural 
institutions;91
• an exception be crafted for the temporary reproduction of digital material 
for exhibition and preservation purposes;92
• an exception be created for fair dealing with copyright material and the 
inclusion of copyright material in broadcasts;93
• an  exception  be  created  for  access  where  a  TPM  is  obsolete,  lost, 
damaged,  defective,  malfunctioning,  or  unusable,  and  where  a  TPM 
interferes with or causes damage or a malfunction to a product, or where 
circumvention is necessary to repair a product;94
• if  format  shifting of  copyright  material,  or  communication of orphaned 
works, becomes non-infringing in future, the Government should consider 
a corresponding exception for TPM circumvention;95
The Committee  concluded by  noting  that  there  is  no  requirement  that  exceptions 
‘expire’ at the end of each review period,96 and recommending that:
• future  administrative  reviews  required  under  Article  17.4.7(e)(viii)  be 
conducted by the Attorney-General’s Department;97
• the Attorney-General should consider ad hoc requests for exceptions under 
the TPM liability scheme according to a statutorily defined process;98
• existing and proposed exceptions be reviewed every four years through a 
statutorily  defined,  public  administrative  review  conducted  by  the 
Attorney-General’s Department;99 and
• “any exceptions  […] should  be  promulgated  as  subordinate  legislation, 
rather than through amendments to the Copyright Act 1968.”100
Requiring a link to copyright infringement
One of the key recommendations put forward by the LACA Committee was that the 
definition  of  ETM  should  require  a  link  to  copyright  infringement.101 Some 
commentators  have  questioned  whether  it  is  appropriate  to  constrain  anti-
circumvention law in this way, arguing that the concept of ‘access control’ protects a 
distinct set of rights which are unrelated to copyright interests. 
There are two key issues which seem to support a reading of anti-circumvention law 
as directly related to copyright interests. The first is the chapeau of Article 17.4.7, 
which,  as  extracted  above  and  explained  by  the  Attorney-General’s  Department, 
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means that Art 17.4.7 “deals only with rights comprising copyright”.102 The second is 
a recent decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,  StorageTek v  
Custom Hardware Engineering,  which held that  “the DMCA must  be read in  the 
context of the Copyright Act, which balances the rights of the copyright owner against 
the  public’s  interest  in  having  appropriate  access  to  the  work.”103 Following  the 
Court’s earlier decision in Chamberlain v Skylink,104 the Court held that “[a] copyright 
owner  alleging  a  violation  of  [the  DMCA]  consequently  must  prove  that  the 
circumvention of the technological measure either infringes or facilitates infringing a 
right protected by the Copyright Act’”.105
In  StorageTek, the defendants were accused of violating the DMCA by bypassing a 
password protection scheme in order to perform maintenance on a series of mass 
storage solutions. The copyright software in question was the executable code loaded 
from memory each time one of the control or management units was rebooted. The 
devices used to bypass the password protection scheme necessarily cause these units 
to be rebooted,  which causes the protected software to be copied into RAM. The 
District Court held that 
[e]ven if  StorageTek were able to prove that  the automatic copying of the 
software into RAM constituted copyright infringement, however, it would still 
have to  show that  the [device]  facilitated that  infringement.  […] If  such a 
nexus were not required, the careful balance that Congress sought to achieve 
between the ‘interests  of  content  creators and information users’  would be 
upset.106
Consequently, because the copying of the software into RAM occurred every time the 
units were rebooted, regardless of whether the devices used by the repair technicians 
were  used  or  not,  then  those  devices  could  not  ‘facilitate’  any  possible 
infringement.107 The devices  allowed access  to  the  copyrighted work  concurrently 
with the copying, but did not ‘facilitate’ that copying. Even though the use of the 
devices  may  violate  contractual  rights  of  StorageTek  against  its  customers,  these 
interests “are not the rights protected by copyright law”.108
The meaning of the AUSFTA must be read in accordance with judicial interpretation 
of the DMCA, and  StorageTek  provides authority that the DMCA is limited to the 
protection of copyright interests. If anti-circumvention under the DMCA requires “a 
sufficient  nexus  between  the  rights  protected  by  copyright  law  and  the 
circumvention”,109 then there can be very little objection to the conclusion reached by 
LACA regarding the implementation of the AUSFTA.  
Conclusion: Key Issues for the Final Legislation
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The  Australian  Federal  Government  now  has  the  difficult  task  of  crafting  the 
implementing legislation. The Government must uphold its international obligations; 
while at the same time ensure that the implementation of the AUSFTA obligations 
does  not  result  in  the  reinforcing  of  TPMs  that  deny  Australian  consumers  their 
legitimate rights to participate in the global market for digital entertainment products. 
Stevens v Sony highlights for the very first time the need to bring into the balance and 
reconcile the fundamental rights of consumers with those of copyright owners. 
While some believe that the Australian Parliament has no room to move on these 
issues due to its existing obligations under the AUSFTA, the LACA Committee has 
shown that there is some room for interpretation of the treaty text in a manner which 
can  support  Australian  anti-circumvention  law  that  appropriately  balances  the 
legitimate interests of copyright owners and the rights of users. The first step in this 
balancing act is the recognition of one of the core recommendations of the LACA 
Committee,  that  liability  for  circumvention  is  clearly  linked  to  copyright 
infringement.  By  following  this  principle  in  the  implementing  legislation,  the 
Australian Parliament should be able to create rules that protect the copyright interests 
of copyright owners, and avoid rules that have the effect of creating new rights, or 
protecting unrelated interests, at the expense of legitimate users.
By  linking  the  definition  of  ‘TPM’  to  copyright  infringement,  the  Australian 
Parliament can avoid granting large-scale protection to copyright owners to regulate 
the use of copyright material. The LACA Committee has shown that doing so should 
not  breach  Australia’s  obligations  under  the  AUSFTA –  indeed,  the  introductory 
words  of  Article  17.4.7  would  seem  to  require  a  sufficient  nexus  to  copyright 
infringement for circumvention liability. As well, the recent US Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals judgment in  StorageTek  provides an interpretation at high judicial level 
that the DMCA is linked to the protection of copyright interests. The Government 
should take note of these principles, and, in drafting the definition of ‘TPM’, ensure 
that  only  technological  measures  which  support  legitimate  copyright  interests  are 
protected – measures which are anti-competitive in nature or for any other reason 
other than the protection of copyright, should not be supported under this scheme.
Regardless of the final definition of what will constitute a technological protection 
measure, the implementation legislation (or subordinate regulations) must carve out 
adequate exceptions from the general rule against circumvention, in order to protect 
legitimate  interests  of  affected  parties.  Again,  the  Australian  Parliament’s  task  is 
made somewhat difficult by the strict criteria that any proposed exception must meet 
under the AUSFTA. Perhaps, it is not possible to create broad exceptions to allow 
circumvention for any non-infringing purposes; however, a flexible and responsive 
review process  will  allow the Government  to  determine areas  of  tension between 
legitimate individual interests and broad prohibitions on circumvention. A specific 
exception, statutory licence, or non-commercial allowance must also be made for the 
manufacture and distribution of circumvention devices, or provision of circumvention 
services, for these permissible purposes, if the exceptions created are to be exercised 
in a meaningful way.
The  creation  of  a  balanced  anti-circumvention  legislative  regime  represents  an 
important plank in the societal bargain that copyright law evidences.110 The Australian 
Parliament, while constrained by its international obligations, has important choices to 
make in the implementation of these obligations, which have the potential to bring 
widespread changes to the way Australians access and enjoy all types of information, 
knowledge, and culture.
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